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Abstract
The next industrial revolution is said to be paved by the use of novel Internet
of Things (IoT) technology. One important aspect of the modern IoT infrastruc-
tures is decentralised communication, often called Peer-to-Peer (P2P). In the
context of industrial communication, P2P contributes to resilience and improved
stability for industrial components. Current industrial facilities, however, still
rely on centralised networking schemes which are considered to be mandatory
to comply with security standards. In order to succeed, introduced industrial
P2P technology must maintain the current level of protection and also consider
possible new threats. The presented work starts with a short analysis of well-
established industrial communication infrastructures and how these could benefit
from decentralised structures. Subsequently, previously undefined Information
Technology (IT) security requirements are derived from the new cloud based
decentralised industrial automation model architecture presented in this paper.
To meet those requirements, state-of-the-art communication schemes and their
open source implementations are presented and assessed for their usability in the
context of industrial IoT. Finally, derived building blocks for industrial IoT P2P
security are presented which are qualified to comply with the stated industrial
IoT security requirements.
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1. Industrial Manufacturing
From the beginning of industrialisation, the process of manufacturing has
been constantly changing. Periods of transformation are often initiated when
new disruptive technologies become available to act as an enabler for emerging
innovative and groundbreaking concepts. Retrospectively viewed, the history of5
industrialisation has experienced three such transformations. Regarding their
impact on the manufacturing process these are often designated as the three
industrial revolutions.
A good illustration for this is the relationship between mechanisation and the
principle of division of labour. According to the findings of eighteenth-century10
philosopher Adam Smith, division of labour [1] is one of the driving forces in
industrial manufacturing which is still present today. While the use of machines
paved the way for the first industrial revolution, division of labour induced the
second industrial revolution and enabled production of goods at affordable prices.
Since that time, the ideology of divided labour has been continually refined and15
has resulted in modern supply chains.
Figure 1: Forces of Industrial Manufacturing
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The development of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) during the
mid-sixties of the twentieth century [2] introduced the capabilities of modern
computer systems to the industrial production process. Among others, two
positive effects of this third industrial revolution were distributed and efficient20
control of complex processes resulting in consistent quality.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship of the outlined forces relevant for the cur-
rent appearance and future evolution of industrial manufacturing. Because of its
age, the division of labour is the most influential force, followed by mechanisation.
Together with the most recently added factor, digitisation, these three factors25
form the basis for the realisation of groundbreaking concepts of the future.
An important role for future industrial manufacturing is digitisation, which
has not yet reached the end of its development cycle (cp. Gartner Hype Cycle
for Supply Chain Strategy [3]). In this cycle the decentralisation of previously
concentrated digital resources is prominent. Among the important factors such30
as costs and usability, security is seen as a main challenge for this technology to
succeed.
2. The Impact of Digitisation
After World War II (WWII), the theoretical foundations of computer science,
initially developed for code breaking, were adapted for industrial use [4]. The35
invention of electronic semiconductors aided the development of integrated PLC
modules. These are the baseline for modern manufacturing systems to satisfy
customer demands for high quality, delivered on the basis of a short time-to-
market which is critical for the success of new products.
Present industrial infrastructures are determined by two prominent char-40
acteristics. Firstly, they are organised along the well-established hierarchical
industrial automation pyramid model. Traditionally, each pyramid represents a
production site which is separated from other sites. Following the paradigm of
division of labour, the second characteristic is the linkage of different production
sites through supply chains.45
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2.1. Industrial Automation Pyramid
Along with the introduction of PLCs to the production process, the classic
industrial automation pyramid illustrated by figure 2 was specified.
Figure 2: IEC 62264 Industrial Automation Pyramid
The automation pyramid follows a hierarchical approach where each layer
has a certain purpose:50
• Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP): This layer hosts the business-
management software which is typically responsible for keeping track of
raw-material flow, production capacity as well as customer orders.
• Manufacturing Execution System (MES): These systems are in
charge of tracking and documenting the transformation of raw materi-55
als to the final products. Typically, MES are interface systems preparing
data for the ERP.
• Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA): This layer
contains the systems for high-level process supervision. For this task, com-
4
puters, networked data communications as well as graphical user interfaces60
are employed.
• Programmable Logic Controller (PLC): This layer contains small
embedded systems controlling functional processes of manufacturing.
• Sensors and Actuators: The lowermost layer includes sensors and actua-
tors which are usually interconnected by fieldbus systems. Sensor readings65
are taken by the PLCs which determines suitable actions for the actuators
on the basis of the programmed logic.
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standardised industrial
automation pyramid model (see IEC 62264 [5]) is still the baseline of modern
industrial infrastructures. Characterised by isolation, restricted physical and70
digital access, this forms the foundation for tamper protection implemented in
current industrial production sites.
2.2. Supply Chains
Throughout the years, the paradigm of labour division introduced an enhance-
ment to the original approach of standalone industrial automation pyramids,75
coupling the independent production sites to complex supply chains.
The result of this development is illustrated by figure 3, where raw material
suppliers provide their educts to the initial upstream producers. From these
educts, upstream manufacturers create their intermediate products and forward
them to the next upstream manufacturer. Combining all intermediate products80
supplied by upstream manufacturers, the final manufacturer on the supply chain
creates the final product which is delivered to the customers. A good example for
such a production chain is the automotive industry, where the final manufacturer
assembles the car from the parts provided by contracted upstream manufacturers.
Each production plane illustrated in figure 3 represents an industrial pyramid85
which is connected to others through supply chains. To maintain the integrity
of the whole supply chain, service providers take care of all necessary tasks like
engineering, maintenance and management.
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Figure 3: Simplified Model of Industrial Supply Chains (Adapted from [6])
In order to streamline manufacturing, the principle of labour division was
continuously refined. Consequently, the number of intermediate products pro-90
vided by subcontractors was raised continuously. To ensure reliable provision of
necessary intermediate products, there was a demand to establish communication
channels along the supply chains. Based on the concept of isolation, enhancement
of the rigid industrial automation pyramid model with outbound communication
channels is challenging.95
Provided that these interactions are limited to the ERP level, implementation
as well as maintenance of the corresponding interfaces can be conducted with
an acceptable effort. As the major parts of the industrial automation pyramid
remains segregated, process-data already known by the ERP can be provided
without impairing isolation significantly. One prominent example for such inter-100
actions is just-in-time manufacturing which is the baseline of lean-production [7].
The complexity of the subjacent layers, however, makes it much more difficult
to implement desired interactions without violating the paradigm of isolation.
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Such connections might be required in cases where more detailed process-data
should be provided in real-time to external requesters.105
2.3. Remote Access Motivates Industrial Information Technology Security
Throughout the years, remote access to industrial facilities gained increased
importance for lean-production and easy remote maintenance. Starting with
small range serial Point-to-Point (PtP) connections in the 1960’s, landline dial-up
modems became the baseline for long range remote access during the 1970’s. At110
the same time, Information Technology (IT) security became relevant for the
first time in the history of industrial digitisation.
Initially, the security of landline remote access was assured by a concept known
as Security by Obscurity. The dial-in numbers to access corresponding industrial
resources were kept secret but beyond that obscurity no additional IT security115
policies were implemented. Authentication methods such as passwords were often
misunderstood as loss of privileges and caused increasing inconvenience. The
fight of the free software movement founder Richard Stallman against passwords
[8] in the mid 1980’s is good evidence of this attitude. With the range of possible
dial-in numbers high and the number of possible adversaries able to afford the120
costs involved in testing all possible numbers low, industry felt pretty secure.
Phreaking, as described in Bruce Sterling’s book “The Hacker Crackdown” [9],
soon proved Security by Obscurity an invalid security scheme for multiple reasons.
The use of certain undisclosed audio frequencies enabled long-distance calls free
of charge. Consequently, initially hypothetical brute-force attacks to secret125
dial-in numbers became feasible for adversaries with limited financial capabilities.
Ironically enough, Security by Obscurity implemented by the landline operators
enabled attacks on obscure dial-in numbers of industrial resources on a large
scale. Finally, the availability of affordable computer systems in the 1980’s,
made phreaking popular. The Cold War computer espionage incident, where130
the German hacker Karl Koch was involved [10], is a good example of that
development.
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During all that time, the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network
(ARPANET) continuously expanded by connecting information systems and
finally evolved to the Internet, the name by which it is known since the 1990’s [11].135
Compared to connection-based landline PtP connections, Internet connections are
packet-based and do not require dedicated communication lines per connection.
Therefore, communication participants can easily eavesdrop all packets within
reach.
While simple authentication methods resolved security issues of past PtP140
connections, the CIA-triad was introduced to mitigate threats emerging from
packet-based connections. The CIA acronym used here is for Confidentiality,
Integrity, and Authentication, indicating the three most important security assets
of modern IT systems. Unlike simple password authentication of the past, CIA
requires the use of cryptographic schemes. To keep these schemes effective, they145
also have to be periodically updated to the respective current state-of-the-art [12].
Due to the paradigm Security by Isolation, IT security of industrial environ-
ments was not investigated for a long time. Separation from the Internet and
uniqueness of industrial sites seemed to be sufficient to reduce the likelihood of
attacks [13]. Both assumptions have failed on a large scale in the recent past150
(cp. Stuxnet attack [14]) and lead to an increased interest in industrial IT and
network security [15].
In contrast to IT security requirements of office environments, Availability of
industrial assets is of high importance as production disturbance might result in
significant financial losses. Therefore, the triad of security objectives is expanded155
to CIAA to be applicable to industrial facilities, where the second A is for
Availability.
3. Arranging the Future
Current industrial facilities implement division of labour primarily in the
fields of rationalisation and utilisation of supply chains. Increased bandwidth for160
packet-oriented networks between different productions sites, however, enables
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further development of division of labour on an infrastructural basis. Therefore,
production machinery of future industrial sites is expected to get increasingly
specialised and become part of frequently rearranged supply chains.
Figure 4: Decentralised Industrial Automation Pyramid
In figure 4 the authors introduce a model of a radical all cloud approach165
implementing the outlined infrastructural division of labour. The presented
model enhances the classic industrial automation pyramid model introduced in
section 2.1 and adds a decentralisation aspect novel for industrial infrastructures.
As the layers of the classic model are still suitable to describe the basic architecture
of industrial facilities, they are also used in the improved model. For the sake170
of simplicity, sensors and actuators are termed machinery. The factor of labour
division is illustrated by clouds representing fractioned and specialised services.
While services on top of the pyramid are software-oriented and virtualised by
server clusters, the base remains hardware-oriented hosting real machines.
Compared to the classic model, production sites are virtualised and composed175
from fractioned services offered by different providers. The producer, illustrated
on top of the pyramid in figure 4, determines the optimal combination of services
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necessary for the respective production cycle. Thanks to the flexible model,
adaptions of chosen combinations are possible at any time when cost optimisation
or compensation for unavailable services is desired.180
Figure 4 also outlines a simplified communication scenario for decentralised
manufacturing, consisting of two producers A and B (see ). In a wider context,
both producers are part of a supply chain, where producer A manufactures
upstream products for producer B. To form the virtual production-line, producer
A determines the optimal service suppliers and establishes a path of decentralised185
communications (see ). These dynamically established interconnections are
used to distribute design files, status information or instructions between the
interlinked services. Possible resource bottlenecks are resolved by the respective
service providers themselves. Such an exemplary case is denoted by  in figure 4,
where a service provider on the machinery layer is offloading workload to a190
subcontractor.
On completion of the actual workpiece, the machinery service provider notifies
the service providers of the virtual production-line of producer B (see ), where
the manufactured upstream products are further processed. To improve the
quality of the provided upstream products, it is feasible that service providers of195
different virtual production-lines share some feedback information on the same
level of operation (see ).
Besides aspects of logistics or standardised interfaces, communications and
sufficient bandwidth are crucial for the proposed concept to succeed. Information
exchange in an industrial setting will happen directly on machinery level. This200
will further increase the importance of secure and reliable machine-to-machine
communication. To achieve a fully intergrated solution, like proposed in figure 4,
hosted services need to be discoverable in an automated manner by the machines
themselves. An broad overview on protocols to support service discovery is
given in [16]. The standardisation of protocols and interfaces helps to develop205
compatible hardware and software solutions to ensure interoperability between
operators and machines. The German Plattform Industrie 4.0 consortium [17]
proposes a Reference Architectural Model Industrie 4.0 (RAMI 4.0) [18] to
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address some of these aspects. Both, the presented decentralised communications
model as well as standardised RAMI 4.0 break up with the traditional Security by210
Isolation paradigm, which dominates industry for decades. Therefore, the topic
of IT security plays an important role [19] for specification and implementation
of future Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) concepts which are also predicted
by publications of the past [20]. Proven by experiences from the past (see
section 2.3), neither deliberate ignorance nor implementation of anti-patterns215
such as Security by Obscurity are viable options to solve this challenge.
In the following sections of the paper, the assets of decentralised industrial
communications are investigated and categorised. Consequently, requirements
for IT security are described. Finally, building blocks of security for the identified
categories are provided.220
4. Use-Cases of Decentralisation
Before essential security requirements for future decentralised IIoT infras-
tructures are introduced, some use-cases for the all cloud approach, presented in
section 3, are provided. These are representative for typical industrial use-case
scenarios and also the baseline for research within the scope of the “German225
reference project for IT security in context to Industrie 4.0” (IUNO) [21]. They
also illustrate the usability of the presented decentralisation approach for real-
world scenarios and aid the definition of significant IT security requirements for
these infrastructures.
4.1. Virtual Manufacturing230
The establishment of virtual manufacturing is beneficial to the sector in
various ways. Two prominent variants, which are the focus of the IUNO project,
are 1) the evaluation of manufacturability of customer individual products and
2) planning shopfloor production environments as virtual environments before
they are implemented in reality.235
Customers demand for more individualised products increases, which can be
observed in industries like furniture manufacturing, where various combination
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possibilities for kitchens or bath cabinets are demanded by the customers. In order
to decide, whether a certain cabinet can be produced with the available machinery,
production is evaluated using a virtual model of the machines on the shopfloor240
as well as a model of the requested product. These models are evaluated in a
simulation to make parameters required for manufacturing plausible. With this
step, possible shortcomings regarding the capabilities of the available machines
can be determined. Furthermore, this analysis step is suitable to identify potential
malicious settings which could harm production equipment and lead to loss of245
production and revenue.
As outlined in section 3, future machinery is likely to be even more spe-
cialised thus more expensive and an investor requires detailed analysis of planned
shopfloor environments before they get build. Such planning is enabled by vir-
tual manufacturing. Using models of the machines planned for the upcoming250
production sites shopfloor can help to identify bottlenecks ahead of time. Fur-
thermore, processes of manufacturing or logistics can be simulated, and based
on the machinery models the producible goods and possible quantities can be
evaluated.
Depending on the detail level of the models and simulated environments, IT255
security related investigations and trainings can be conducted. Such a setting
allows the study of real-world IT security incidents. It is possible to evaluate
various strategies for mitigation, defence and protection without risking the real
production equipment. With the identified findings the IT infrastructure of
already deployed and newly planned sites can be further improved.260
4.2. Technology Data Marketplace
Following the proposed division of labour, even on machinery level, production
equipment should be well utilised in order to maximise revenues. In periods
where free capacities are available, these can be offered to third parties. A
practicable implementation of capacity allocation requires the implementation of265
a management platform which also addresses aspects of logistics and accounting.
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These platforms can be also employed to implement a marketplace for different
kinds of digital goods.
Different aspects of digital marketplaces are researched as part of the IUNO
project. The researched use-case provides approaches for monetising manufac-270
turing parameters often classified as secret intellectual property. An example
of these parameters are instructions for the treatment of various raw materials
processed by different cutting techniques such as water jet or laser cutting.
Additionally, topics like parameter licensing, data quality and data provi-
sioning are researched. In the course of the research, secure availability was275
identified to be important. Therefore, a distributed infrastructure implementing
the CIAA paradigm is also considered to be beneficial for this use-case.
4.3. Secure Remote Maintenance
Since the early times of landline dial-up PtP connections, remote maintenance
is a topic of interest. The advent of packet-oriented networks and the Internet280
as a globally accessible network has enabled novel use-case scenarios. As a
consequence, remote connection devices are deployed on a large scale to be
part of the Internet of Things (IoT), reducing the need for physical presence for
machine maintenance or the acquisition of sensor readings.
To add convenience and accountability, remote maintenance is bundled285
with Ticket Request Systems (TRSs). These assign individual identifiers to
each incoming case and help supporters and customers in progress tracking.
Additionally, ticket systems are linked to certain remote connection devices,
providing dynamic access for supporters.
Separated from public reach, it is supposed that remote maintenance services290
highly benefit from secure decentralised industrial infrastructures as these also
foster interlinkage with third party components such as TRSs.
4.4. Visual Control Centres
Another challenge in the field of industrial control systems is the aggregation
and visualisation of acquired data obtained from different sources. Virtual295
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dashboards refine such data for further inspection and help technicians to oversee
critical process steps in manufacturing.
To enhance the benefit of these systems, anomaly detection algorithms as well
as signature-based analysis of transferred data are introduced to form a Visual
Security Control Centre (VSCC). Along with process supervision, the VSCC300
provides additional data for IT specialists to detect attacks on IT infrastructures.
The concept of secure decentralised industrial infrastructures improves data
transfer which is the basis for traditional process monitoring. Especially, the
option of outsourcing data processing to specialised third parties is seen as
beneficial. Furthermore, the concept enables secure exchange of attack patterns305
between different participants of virtualised production lines such as introduced
by figure 4 in section 3. Reaction time proved to be a good mitigation strategy
in cases of attacks on infrastructures. Therefore, redundant availability of known
attack patterns for VSCCs is seen as an additional benefit.
5. Requirements for Secure Infrastructures310
In the preceding sections, a model for a radical decentralised industrial
infrastructure was introduced and substantiated by industry use-case scenarios.
In this section, the basic requirements for secure decentralised infrastructures are
outlined which are considered as assets later on. Subsequently, dangers for these
assets are examined using a threat classification model to identify vulnerabilities.315
From these, protection needs are determined and finally classified utilising the
CIAA model.
Figure 5 presents all steps of the applied methodology. To cover a broad
range of requirements for secure decentralised industrial infrastructures, figure 5
also contains a characteristical communication scenario adapted from figure 4.320
The scenario illustrates data exchange between participants of different virtual
production lines beyond office and company boundaries posing new technical
challenges. Considering the outlined use-cases from section 4, five generic
requirement categories have been identified.
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Figure 5: Methodology Determining Security Requirements
The requirement categories as well as the results of the corresponding security325
assessments are the basis for the elaborated building blocks of security.
5.1. Use-Case Asset Definition
From evaluation of the communication scenarios described in section 3 and
the use-cases introduced in section 4, important assets have been developed. In
order to maintain the integrity of a virtual production line, these assets have to330
be maintained by protecting them against attacks.
5.1.1. Secure Data Transfer
Assuming that all communication participants of a virtual production line are
situated at separated locations, secure communication schemes are mandatory.
As decentralised infrastructures replace fixed structures with dynamic ones, the335
concept of End-to-End (E2E) security plays an important role. Eliminating
zones of trust which are typical for current industrial networks, each entity of
the decentralised infrastructure has to ensure secure data transfer.
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5.1.2. Connection Establishment
Because of the absence of fixed network infrastructures, topics of secure340
network discovery and identification of valid communication participants are
crucial. Besides dynamic routing, the issue of bypassing restrictions of underlying
networks are important.
5.1.3. Identity Management
Coordinating flexible lines of production requires secure options for registra-345
tion, authentication and management of communication participants. This also
involves secure storage and management of required authentication credentials.
5.1.4. Data Processing
For each of the presented use-cases, secure processing of data is important.
Since data is produced by various sources and transmitted via different networks,350
aggregation and storage is a challenging task. Enabling provisioning of all nodes
associated to a virtual production line with manufacturing data, repositories
have to be implemented. Due to the decentralised approach, the data has to be
processed to match the requirements of the respective use-case. One example is
the disaggregation of huge data blocks in order to realise redundant provisioning.355
For this reason, the identification of data chunks also plays an important role
in data processing. Additionally, post-processing could also be enriched with
adaptive schemes for plausibility testing of received data to minimise risk of
malfunctions.
5.2. Threat Assessment360
For identification and quantification of possible threats for the outlined assets,
the STRIDE [22] classification model is employed. For this approach, the
following threats are considered to be of importance:
• Spoofing: Any violation of authenticity. Attacks include message spoofing
or forged communication partners.365
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• Tampering: Any violation of integrity. Attacks include alteration, replay
or malformation of messages or data.
• Repudiation: Threats for the transparency of actions, resulting in un-
linkability of events to their cause.
• Information Disclosure: Any violation of confidentiality. Attacks in-370
clude eavesdropping and also the use of forged communication partners.
• Denial of Service: Illegitimate blocking of services by third parties.
Usually, Denial of Service (DOS) is initiated by resource starvation of
available bandwidth, computation power or memory.
• Elevation of Privilege: Increasing privileges for an entity through ma-375
nipulations or bypassing.
STRIDE defines the following abstract standard assets:
• Processes: Computing resources used for data processing.
• Data Stores: Resources utilised for permanent or temporary data reten-
tion.380
• External Entities: Systems not controlled by the respective object of
investigation. This includes remote communication partners, such as
remote computer systems, but involves also Human to Machine Interaction
(HMI).
• Data Flows: Transmission of data between entities.385
The concept of trust boundaries is completing the STRIDE model. Within
one trust boundary, the level of confidence in security is the same, as an attacker
needs the same effort to access any system within this boundary.
Therefore, one suitable technique in determining threats is data flow analysis.
Whenever the data flow is crossing a predefined boundary, emerging threats can390
be identified and recorded for subsequent evaluation. Substantiated by expert
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knowledge and literature [12], each of the introduced standard assets can be
correlated to characteristic threats of the STRIDE model. Taking this experience
into account, typical correlations between standard assets and threats can be
summarised as shown by table 1.395












Tampering   
Repudiation   
Information Disclosure   
Denial of Service   
Elevation of Privilege 
To obtain comparable results from the analysis, the use-case assets from
section 5.1 are mapped to the introduced standard assets of this section. As the
use-case assets combine different application scenarios, they cannot simply be
matched to one specific standard asset counterpart. Multiple standard assets
have to be assigned to each of the use-case assets in order to outline the complete400
picture. The results are shown by table 2.
A good illustration of this course of action is the use-case asset Secure Data
Transfer which is comprising not only the application scenario data transfer,
but also authentication of involved communication peers. To cover all possible
threats for the considered scenarios, Secure Data Transfer has been linked to the405
STRIDE standard assets External Entities and Data Flows.
In the following section, general IT security protection objectives are in-
troduced. These are associated to the use-case asset classes and the basis for
identifying mitigations for the threats summarised by table 2.
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Secure Data Transfer  
Connection Establishment  
Identity Management  
Data Processing  
5.3. IT Security Protection Objectives410
To qualify IT security protection needs, literature [23] specifies a set of pro-
tection objectives which are commonly accepted. In practice, each objective has
corresponding building blocks of security implementing the respective protection.
Figure 6: IT Security Protection Objectives
Figure 6 illustrates these objectives ordered by the role they play in IT security.
The centre of secure systems is formed by the foundation of trust consisting of415
Integrity combined with Authenticity. Measures of Integrity protection ensure
that data corruptions can be detected while Authenticity assures that the source
of data is known and trusted.
Although, technical implementations of Authenticity always requiring In-
tegrity for data and cryptographic keys, separation of both terms is reasonable.420
As the foundation of trust is implemented utilising building-blocks from both
categories, it is crucial to employ a significant terminology to address these pre-
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cisely. Furthermore, in some industrial use-cases, Integrity is applied standalone
when just data protection is desired.
The diagonally opposite objectives of the remaining groups Privacy and425
Reliability, are contradicting each other. Therefore, it is not possible to satisfy
them at the same degree if both are to protect a specific asset. A sharp contrast
is the relation of Transparency and Unlinkability. While Transparency requires
data recording and retention for continuous analysis, Unlikability demands data
minimisation facilitating privacy. The same applies for Confidentiality and430
Availability, as encryption misconfigurations might render critical process-data
unreadable.











Secure Data Transfer Auth C, I, Av
Connection Establishment Auth I, (C)
Identity Management I, Auth,C,Av I, Auth
Data Processing Auth,Av, I, T Av, I, C, T
To identify the need for action, the IT security protection objectives of figure 6
are assigned to the Assets outlined by table 2. The result is shown by table 3
where the objectives are listed in their decreasing order of importance. As the435
topic of Transparency is considered to be paramount for industrial use-cases,
the objective Unlinkabiltiy was not considered in table 3 and is also not further
evaluated.
6. Safeguarding Decentralised IoT Structures
Section 5 specified the security requirements for the decentralised industrial440
infrastructures outlined in section 3. Taking the identified IT protection objec-
tives of table 3 into account, this section presents methods for safeguarding the
corresponding assets.
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6.1. Building-Blocks of Security
To implement measures satisfying the generalised IT security protection445
objectives stated in section 5.3, the state-of-the-art provides distinct building
blocks. These can broadly be classified into the categories Primitives and
Protocols which are utilised to secure Applications.
Figure 7: Relation of Protocols to their Corresponding Primitives
The primitives can be considered to be the smallest element of a security
implementation. Based on cryptographic methods, these are the basis for450
Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity. Figure 7 introduces common used
methods and shows some of their practical implementations.
In applications where Confidentiality should be established while consuming
only little system resources, Symmetric Ciphers are used. Though, small hardware
requirements are beneficial for embedded platforms, all participants are required455
to share the same cryptographic key which is referred to as Pre-Shared-Key
(PSK). This introduces an overhead in key management and distribution which
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is often seen as a drawback for the ease of use. Figure 7 introduces the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) as a well-known representative of this class of ciphers.
Some of the available Symmetric Ciphers also support different modes, enhancing460
the provided level of protection and targeting additional protection objectives.
A good example is the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of AES also contributing
Integrity and Authenticity to the protection.
To protect data Integrity and make information uniquely identifiable, crypto-
graphic Hash Functions are employed. These are one-way functions, generating465
an unique string of fixed length known as fingerprint from an arbitrary amount
of input-data. As the unique string exactly maps to the respective input-data, it
is called a Digest. An important design goal of Hash Functions is a high degree
of collision resistance, which means that similar input-data leads to the creation
of Digests differing significantly from each other.470
One-way function and collision resistance makes Hash Functions also in-
teresting for authentication purposes as it is used by Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Codes (HMACs) [24].
Finally, there is the family of Asymmetric Ciphers which is based on the
principle of public-key cryptography [25] and providing basic building blocks for475
Authenticity and Confidentiality. As these schemes are resource demanding, they
are often used together with other cryptographic primitives as part of hybrid
schemes. The security of the commonly employed Asymmetric Ciphers rests on
two mathematical problem classes. The first class is based on Prime Factorisation
(PF) for big numerical values and is the foundation of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman480
(RSA) public-key cryptosystem. The second class utilises the difficulty of finding
the Discrete Logarithm (DL) [26] for certain mathematical groups. It is the basis
for establishing secret keys via a public communication channel and denoted as
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange. Apart from advances in research solutions
for these mathematical problems, improvements in computation power pose a485
great risk for these ciphers. As a consequence, the recommended key-lengths
(see [27]) are increased constantly in order to retain security of currently used
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schemes for a predictive period of time. Additionally, alternatives also known as
post-quantum cryptographic functions [28], are researched.
To utilise the introduced cryptographic primitives for their use in applications,490
they are joined together by cryptographic protocols. Some real use-case applica-
tion examples are illustrated by figure 7. In all of these examples, the basic CIA
protection relies on the reliability of the underlying primitives. Therefore, an
important design goal of protocols is interchangeability of certain cryptographic
functions to enable fallback scenarios and support cryptographic agility. As ex-495
plained on the example of Asymmetric Ciphers, also the length of cryptographic
keys has to be adjustable and comply with the recommendations of reputable
institutes.
Analogous to the relation of the introduced primitives to their respective
protection objective, complex use-cases are split into small function-blocks. One500
example for that issue is the use-case “communication”, which can be considered
to be composed of function-blocks for Key Agreement, Identity and Transport
Security. Following that scheme, the well-known Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol [29] is labeling the ciphers which are used by the particular cipher-suites.
While the function-blocks of secure communication use-cases inherit their505
CIA properties from the employed primitives, the remaining security objectives
Availability and Transparency are implemented on the protocol layer itself. To
achieve this, suitable primitives are combined with other necessary methods.
An example for protocols implementing Transparency are Distributed Ledgers
[30]. These are linked lists where sets of transactions are recorded in a chrono-510
logical sequence. These sets are called blocks and are continuously synchronised
with all participating peers. The complete history of all relevant blocks is known
by all peers representing a log of all transactions enabling Transparency. Hash
functions are employed to guarantee the integrity of all log entries. To prevent
an attacker from recreating complete transaction logs with falsified data, the515
prerequisite of a successful recording is a proof-of-work to a resource consuming
cryptographic challenge. One well-known practical example for an implementa-
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tion of Distributed Ledgers are the various cryptographic currencies whose base
technology is broadly known as Block Chain [31].
Implementations of Availability are following the same principle. One valid520
approach to guarantee this protection goal is to generate data redundancies
provided by several computer systems. To streamline that process, data slices are
created and made uniquely identifiable through the creation of Hash Function
Digests. The data slices are deployed to their decentralised infrastructure which
is able to track them by their Digests.525
Because of its complexity, the majority of the codebase is utilised for the
protocol functions. Taking also into account, that program code of the protocol
layer is the first instance processing data received from external sources, protocols
seem to be more susceptible to attacks than particular primitives. Therefore,
specification and development of new security protocols requires subtle and530
cost intensive testing throughout the whole product life-cycle to detect serious
mistakes [32]. Also, for this reason, only proven cryptographic primitives should
be used and unnecessary reinventions avoided [33].
To enable small and mid sized enterprises participation, one requirement
for future decentralised industrial infrastructures is reuse of existing technology535
where it is suitable. In this context, the use of Free and Open Source (FOS) is
seen to be highly beneficial as access to specifications and source code enables
security audits as well as intensive testing for interested parties.
6.2. A Brief Outline of Promising Free and Open Source Approaches
In this section, a set of promising FOS tools and their baseline protocols are540
introduced. In the course of the research, these have been identified as suitable
building-blocks for an implementation of future decentralisation scenarios such as
outlined in section 4. Table 4 provides an overview of these tools and illustrates
where they help safeguarding the Use-Case Assets defined in section 5.1. Finally,
table 5 gives a summary of the underlying security protocols for each tool and545
maps them to the IT security protection objectives stated in section 5.3.
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WireGuard   
BorgBackup  
Syncthing    
TOR  
B.A.T.M.A.N. 
NetBSD Syslogd  
The Tangle 
Invented by Bram Cohen in 2001, the BitTorrent protocol is the first and
oldest practical implementation of a distributed Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file sharing
protocol. Because of its age, it also inspired other FOS projects implementing
elements of decentralisation. Currently, the advancement of the protocol is550
coordinated by BitTorrent Enhancement Proposals (BEPs) [34] where proposals
and specifications of new features are assigned unique numbers. According
to the initial protocol specification, files are split into chunks which are made
uniquely identifiable by cryptographic hash values. Whenever a file is shared
by a peer, these hash values and additional metadata are provided to a central555
service which is called tracker. Maintaining the metadata the tracker acts as a
directory for all shared files which can also be queried by other peers. As every
communication participant acts also as a server for all received chucks, the tracker
is regularly updated with such metadata by all participating peers. Identified
the tracker as a single point of failure threatening the Availability of the evolved560
P2P swarm, a BEP specifying Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) was made. With
this enhancement, the peers keep track of all metadata themselves. Therefore,
the tracker is only crucial during the connection phase of a peer for initial
metadata bootstrapping. Enhancing the scalability of the established P2P swarm,
another BEP specifies use of multiple trackers which turned out to be ineffective565
compared to the DHT approach [35]. Addressing file sharing, Confidentiality
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and Authenticity are not primary protection goals. Nevertheless, BEP-35 drafts
a signature method to verify the Authenticity of a torrent issuer. The topic of
Confidentiality is targeted by BEP-08 proposing some weak obfuscation. As this
scheme turned out not to be very effective so far, Confidentiality is still left to570
underlying secure transport protocols such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs).
Ensuring secure communications on the transport layer in terms of Confiden-
tiality, Integrity and Authenticity, various FOS as well as proprietary solutions
are available. Implementing future decentralised industrial IoT infrastructures,
especially the FOS WireGuard (WG) [36] VPN provides a set of promising ap-575
proaches. On the basis, WG employs the Noise Protocol Framework [37] which is
a solid foundation implementing Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity. The
verification of remote peers rests on asymmetric public-key cryptography and
Public Key Pinning (PKP). Therefore, it is possible that secure authenticated
connections are established automatically. Adding to the resilience of the proto-580
col, session cookies were implemented making DOS attacks harder. With session
cookies, any initial connection is linked to a cryptographic challenge the peer has
to solve. Since the proof-of-work is a prerequisite for a successful handshake, the
risks of DOS attacks resulting in resource starvation are effectively mitigated.
As the aspect of performance is one of the key development objectives, WG585
is implemented as a Loadable Kernel Module (LKM) for the Linux Operating
System reducing significantly the overhead in Userspace/Kernelspace interaction.
This aspect and less resource consuming cryptographic primitives make this
VPN interesting for embedded IoT appliances. Compared to well-established
standards like Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), WG enables simple setup and590
is based on a simple design consisting of less than 4,000 lines of code. The latter
aspect also allows formal verification of the codebase which is currently being
conducted [38].
Utilising the file chunking approach also known from BitTorrent, Borg-
Backup [39] implements a backup solution from this technology. Efficiently595
utilising the storage, BorgBackup performs a deduplication on chunk-level. From
an IT security point of view, the software provides encryption capabilities ensur-
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ing Integrity as well as Authenticity for the data. In cases of backup distribution
or remote updates, the Secure SHell (SSH) protocol [40] is used for transport
security.600
While BitTorrent implements an unrestricted swarm file sharing among
self-organised P2P nodes, the Syncthing [41] specification realises a secure
decentralised file storage used for community clouds. Basically, Syncthing is
used to keep files synchronised on different authorised systems. Analogous to
BitTorrent, subprotocols are specified for the different IT security protection605
objectives. On the basis, anonymous TLS is employed for Confidentiality and
Integrity. The Syncthing Block Exchange Protocol (SBEP) is responsible for
the complete data processing and the authentication of connecting peers. For
efficient transmission, files are partitioned into chunks which can also be requested
separately by authorised peers. For authentication, the SBEP layer receives610
the asymmetric cryptographic authentication fingerprint obtained from the
anonymous TLS handshake. Verifying the privileges of a connecting peer, the
SBEP is performing a lookup on a list of a locally saved PKP table. If the received
fingerprint is listed with sufficient permissions, access is granted by the SBEP.
Implementing Availability, two protocols are provided. Detecting Syncthing615
shares on local networks, periodical checks are performed by the Syncthing Local
Discovery Protocol. Shares which are not available on local networks are found
by the Syncthing Global Disovery Protocol where a directory server maintains
the status of all participating Syncthing instances. In cases where access between
two Syncthing instances is blocked by a firewall, the Syncthing Relay Protocol620
enables the communication through an intermediate server. Since the relay
server is acting as a TLS proxy, the E2E security is also maintained in such
scenarios.
As stated in the previous sections, the IT security protection objective,
Unlinkability, does not play an important role in industrial infrastructures.625
For the sake of completeness and because of its interesting distributed net-
working approach, the The Onion Router (TOR) [42] is worth mentioning. To
enable privacy, data traffic between two peers is relayed through a cascade of
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nodes which ensures that its origin gets anonymised. To avoid information
disclosure in the course of the relaying process, the traffic between the peers630
gets encrypted following an onion-model scheme. Implementing the concept of
distributed networking eliminates the problem of single point of failure in net-
work organisation. Hence, protocols such as TOR are also potentially interesting
candidates in the efforts to enhance Availability.
Another approach of distributed networking are ad hoc mesh network pro-635
tocols such as the proprietary Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) standard 802.11s. Initially developed for Wireless Local Area Networks
(WLAN), FOS implementations like Better Approach To Mobile Ad-hoc Net-
working advanced (B.A.T.M.A.N.) are also used to employ existing Wide Area
Networks (WANs) as a basis for establishing and maintaining separate decen-640
tralised networks. A good practical example where scalability of distributed
networking is also researched are the networks operated by the German Freifunk
movement [43]. Since ad hoc networks should allow unrestricted meshing of
all participating nodes, topics of Authenticity are mostly not covered by the
respective specifications. For the B.A.T.M.A.N. protocol, the BatCave extension645
[44] proposes a node authentication approach.
For future industrial decentralised applications, topics of accountability will
be of high relevance. Enabling Transparency, the topic of secure logging is of
importance. Since some potential adversaries have also access to the raw log files,
maintaining the integrity of once authenticated entries is challenging. For cases650
where logs must be kept locally, the Request for Comments (RFC) standard 5848
[45] specifies a scheme which is also known as syslog-sign and found as a secure
portion of the NetBSD [46] version of Syslogd. Compared to other approaches,
its theoretical foundations [47] are quite mature and have been refined constantly.
Therefore, it is considered to be a capable candidate satisfying the IT security655
protection objective Transparency.
If distribution of logged information is a feasible approach for a certain
application scenario, Distributed Ledgers are a valid option to establish Trans-
parency. Addressing also the issue of small embedded systems which are typical
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for industrial manufacturing infrastructures, The Tangle [48] provides a scheme660
for the implementation of a resource friendly but secure Distributed Ledger.
Compared to other protocols like Bitcoin, The Tangle is not based on fees which
is obsoleting powerful authorities required for the authentication of new entries.
To make a valid transaction, a peer has simply to validate two randomly selected
transactions which are recorded in a Direct Acyclic Graph (DAG) forming a665
tangled structure. One benefit of this structure is, that sub-tangles can also
be temporarily detached and operated from the main-tangle, enabling off-line
transactions. This feature and the use of DAGs adds to scalability of the system.
While the technology has been open sourced, the non-profit IOTA foundation
maintains an ecosystem which can actually also be used for micro-payments.670
Fostering industrial use-cases, the IOTA foundation also currently collaborates
with industrial partners. The name IOTA itself is not referring to an acronym
[49] as it would be guessed first, but to the ninth letter of the Greek alphabet.
Since the expression “not one iota” (cp. the Bible, Matthew 5:18) also refers to
very small amounts, the term IOTA also underpins the intended relevance for675
micro-payments.
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Table 5: Open Source Tools Mapped to IT Security Protection Objectives

Tools / Underlying Protocols
Protection Objectives
C U I Auth T Av
BitTorrent
BEP-03: BitTorrent  
BEP-05: DHT 
BEP-08: Obfuscation 
BEP-12: Multi Tracker 
BEP-35: Torrent Signing  
WireGuard
Noise Protocol Framework   
Session Cookies 
BorgBackup
SSH   
Borg-RPC    
Syncthing
TLS  
Bock Exchange Protocol  
Global Discovery Protocol 
Local Discovery Protocol 
Relay Protocol 
TOR
Onion Routing   
B.A.T.M.A.N.
Batman Protocol  
BatCave Proposal  
NetBSD Syslogd
TLS   
Syslog-sign   
The Tangle
Direct Acyclic Graph   
Distribution 
This section provided an overview of some promising protocols currently
developed and implemented by several FOS communities. Although, none of
the presented tools at their current development state is able to implement
the complete model architecture of section 3, the presented core-technologies680
represent a good starting point for an implementation of secure decentrialised
future industrial IoT infrastructures based on FOS tools.
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Summary
This work summarises the technological progress of industrial IoT up to the
present day. Familiarising with the concept of division of labour, the impacts of685
the additional forces mechanisation and digitisation on manufacturing processes
were introduced. In essence, the whole progress can be expressed by the model
provided by figure 1 where the axes illustrate the progress of the identified forces
over time. It is assumed, that creation of each of the axes originates from events
which are also referred to as industrial revolutions [50]. Especially digitisation690
affected modern manufacturing very much and led to the establishment of
hierarchies resulting in well and tightly organised supply chains as illustrated by
figure 3.
These links identified so far, served as starting point allowing an estimation
for the future. A model of a decentralised industrial IoT based upon expected695
future requirements is presented in section 3. The developed result is denoted as
all cloud approach and illustrated by figure 4.
Even though the outlined model is considered to be more a subject of future
development, there are real-world use-cases derived from current research projects
provided in section 4 which will benefit from such an environment. As the700
introduced scenario requires sustainable changes of the associated manufacturing
processes, possible threats and mitigation strategies have to be considered first.
Consequently, the provided real-world use-cases served as a basis to derive the
use-case specific assets of section 5.1. By applying the well-established STRIDE
threat analysis on them, corresponding threats were identified. Correlating these705
with the use-case assets the corresponding IT security protection objectives are
derived and provided by table 3. The result forms the starting point for selecting
suitable combinations of security mechanisms to mitigate the identified threats.
Finally, section 6 presents a systematic foundation to show how the identified
security requirements can be addressed by technical actions. Open Source projects710
are suggested as an appropriate solution to face these challenges. Adapting
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proven methods from established open source projects aids establishing a reliable
and economical future manufacturing environment.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this work two models were developed and presented. The first one is715
illustrated by figure 1 and arranges technological and organisational aspects
to the context of the evolution of industrial manufacturing. From this model
it was concluded, that the current developments in industrial IoT cannot be
viewed as groundbreaking new. Following the path of these findings, those
new developments are seen as further development of division of labour in720
combination with digitisation. Continuing this thought and incorporating the
current state of industrial manufacturing and associated future requirements,
a model describing a likely future industrial manufacturing environment was
developed and introduced in figure 4. Concluding the results so far, current
developments in industrial manufacturing are not seen as groundbreaking and725
denoting them as a 4th industrial revolution is not justifiable as it is often argued
by certain parties. The sum of all steps, however, is heading in that direction
and forms the basis for the next pending technical revolution.
In each phase towards that direction, IT security is an essential component
establishing and maintaining integrity of industrial manufacturing environments.730
As it is expected that future industrial facilities will be mesh-worked, IT security
provides the anchor to facilitate safeguarding functional safety features. All these
aspects require that IT security is not be seen as just a minor aspect of product
development. It rather has to be treated as a process supporting the product
lifetime avoiding mistakes known from other IoT domains (e.g. [51] and [52]).735
To address these challenges, proven solutions from other domains such as office
IT can be transferred and this will provide a good starting point. Adjustments
to these solutions, however, must address the specific requirements of industrial
manufacturing.
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Investigating the feasibility of knowledge transfers to the industrial domain,740
history tells us that such approach is not uncommon. Demonstrated by the
adaption of early computer science findings initially developed for the purposes
of WWII [4], novelties are regularly adapted for industrial manufacturing, but
sometimes with a significant delay. It turns out, that the driving factor for these
improvements is often not their innovation aspect, but efficiency enhancement745
resulting in cost reductions or legal requirements.
Beyond the technical viewpoint, the outlined development can influence other
domains. As seen from the past developments, disruptive changes in the technical
world also affect economy and society. Therefore, another task of future research
is to investigate the effects of progressing digitisation and radical division of750
labour on society and related coping strategies [53].
The key idea behind the presented work is to use available and proven com-
ponents whenever possible to master the industrial IT security challenges ahead.
The basic approach was demonstrated on a future manufacturing environment
consisting of inter-meshed entities. Addressing the expected increasing complex-755
ity security minded development strategies and following the paradigm Security
by Design are seen to be important. Even though these might not be applicable
to existing legacy systems, newly designed systems and environments should con-
sider a proper security design and maintain agreed security standards throughout
the complete lifetime of the respective devices.760
In conclusion, IT security is not a product [54] and will never become one.
Ensuring reliability and IT security throughout the complete lifetime of operation,
life cycle management processes have to be defined, maintained and pursued.
To be effective, these processes need to be continuously reviewed to reflect the
particular state-of-the-art and must also be applied by associated subcontractors.765
This paper provided a look into a probable future of industrial manufacturing
and summarised challenges as well as possible open source solutions for associated
IT security issues. To identify opportunities resulting from possible technology
transfer, upcoming research has to focus on interdisciplinary collaboration be-
tween IT security specialists and experts of the respective domains. This is seen770
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as an important key factor in developing sustainable, secure and cost efficient
future designs.
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â€œIntelligent Networksâ€ research group. Born in Hamburg in 1989, he received his Diploma in the field of 
Computer Science with a specialization in embedded systems in 2015. His main research interests lay in machine 
learning and its application to the field of industrial IT-security. He is currently working on and coordinating the 
DFKIâ€™s contribution to the research project IUNO.
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Prof. Dr.-Ing- Hans D. Schotten is a full professor and head of the chair for Wireless Communications and Navigation 
at the University of Kaiserslautern. In addition to that, he is Scientific Director of the Intelligent Networks Research 
Group of the German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI). He received his Ph.D. in Electrical 
Engineering from the RWTH Aachen in 1997. He was a research group leader there before changing into industry. At 
Ericsson, he held the position of Senior Researcher, after that he held the position of Director of Technical Standards 
at Qualcomm. His topics of interest are wireless communication and 5G.
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Dr Thomas Newe is a Senior Lecturer in Computer Engineering in the Department of Electronic & Computer 
Engineering at The University of Limerick and is a funded investigator in the SFI Confirm Manufacturing Centre. He 
holds a B.Eng. in Computer Engineering, a Masters in Engineering in Security Protocol Design and a PhD in Formal 
Logics for Security Protocol Verification. He has been a University of Limerick faculty member since 1994. His 
research interest includes many topics under the general areas of data security for Wireless Sensor Networks and the 
Internet of Things. He has graduated a number of PhD students in the broad area of network and data security. His 
students are funded from a variety of sources including: EU, SFI, IRC, Internationally and industrially funded.
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Decentralised communication is a important aspect for modern Internet of
Things infrastructures.
In industrial use cases decentralised communication gains importance.
Peer to Peer technology provides techniques to establish resilient and
secure infrastructures.
Suitable model architectures are developed and presented supporting
security by design for industrial Internet of Things environments.
Identified IT security building blocks enable development of sustainable
and secure future infrastructures.
